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1. The uCP Directive 
in 2005, the eu Directive on unfair Commercial practices (referred to as the 
uCp Directive or the Directive) was adopted.1 The uCp Directive, which evolved 
from its precursor, the misleading and Comparative advertising Directive,2 has 
the ambitious aim of addressing unfair commercial practices directly related to 
distorting consumers’ economic behaviour concerning transactional decisions.3 
here, we give a brief overview of the scope of application and framework of the 
UCP Directive for the benefit of readers who are new to the subject; those readers 
well familiar with the uCp Directive may choose to move to part 2. 
The uCp Directive is a horizontal framework directive of a maximum 
harmonization nature. it has a very broad scope of application as it covers all 
business-to-consumer commercial practices in all sectors of economic activity.4 
any business-to-consumer commercial practice before, during and after a 
1 Directive 2005/29 Directive 2005/29/eC of the european parliament and of the 
Council of 11 may 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices 
in the internal market and amending Council Directive 84/450/eeC, Directives 97/7/eC, 
98/27/eC and 2002/65/eC of the european parliament and of the Council and regulation 
(eC) no 2006/2004 of the european parliament and of the Council (Text with eea 
relevance), OJ 2005 l 149/22 (hereafter: uCp directive).
2 Council Directive 84/450/eeC of 10 september 1984 relating to the 
approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the member states 
concerning misleading advertising, OJ 1984 l250/17, as amended by Directive 97/55/eC 
of the european parliament and of the Council of 6 october 1997 amending Directive 
84/450/eeC concerning misleading advertising to include comparative advertising, OJ 
1997 l290/18. further on the historical background of the uCp Directive, see J stuyck, 
E Terryn and T Van Dyck, ‘Confidence through Fairness? The New Directive on Unfair 
Business-to-Consumer Commercial practices in the internal market’ (2006) 43 Common 
Market L.Rev. 107, 109 ff.
3 according to art 2(k) upC Directive, ‘transactional decision’ denotes ‘any 
decision taken by a consumer concerning whether, how and on what terms to purchase, 
make payment in whole or in part for, retain or dispose of a product or to exercise a 
contractual right in relation to the product, whether the consumer decides to act or to refrain 
from acting’. 
4 Cf. h Collins, ‘The unfair Commercial practices Directive’ (2005) ECLR 417, 
418. 
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transaction is covered by the Directive, thus including marketing, advertising, 
sales practices and after-sales conduct.5 
it contains core provisions on unfair commercial practices, a black list of 
practices deemed unfair, and dedicated rules on various topics such as Codes 
of Conduct and the relationship with various information duties in other eu 
legislation. moreover, the Directive contains provisions on enforcement. 
The core of the Directive lies in the prohibition of practices contrary to the 
requirements of professional diligence which materially distort or are likely to 
materially distort the economic behaviour of the average consumer with regard to 
a product or a service.6 Thus, unfair commercial practices consist of two elements: 
the (potential for) material distortion of consumers’ transactional decision-
making and the normative yardstick of professional diligence.7 The notion of 
‘material distortion’ is further defined as the impairment of the ability to make an 
informed decision, thereby causing the (average) consumer to take a transactional 
decision that he would not have taken otherwise.8 The open-textured concept of 
‘professional diligence’ refers to ‘the standard of special skill and care which a 
trader may reasonably be expected to exercise towards consumers, commensurate 
with honest market practice and/or the general principle of good faith in the 
trader’s field of activity’.9
in practice, however, the main general clause prohibiting unfair commercial 
practices may be less important than the two more concrete subcategories of 
misleading and aggressive practices. If a particular practice fits the description 
5 art 2(d); art 3(1) uCp Directive. 
6 art 5 uCp Directive. Generally on the unfairness concept in the uCp Directive, 
see, e.g., B Keirsbilck, The New European Law of Unfair Commercial Practices and 
Competition Law (oxford/portland: hart publishing, 2011) 271 ff.; s Weatherill and 
u Bernitz (eds), The Regulation of Unfair Commercial Practices under EC Directive 
2005/29. New Rules and New Techniques (studies of the oxford institute of european and 
Comparative law, oxford: hart publishing, 2006) 1 ff.; h-W micklitz, ‘The General Clause 
on unfair practices’ in GG howells, h-W micklitz and T Wilhelmsson (eds), European 
Fair Trading Law. The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (aldershot: ashgate, 2006) 
83 ff.
7 in light of arts 6 and 9 uCp Directive, art 5 uCp Directive serves as a stand-
alone ‘safety net’. see european Commission, ‘first report on the application of 
Directive 2005/29/eC of the european parliament and of the Council of 11 may 2005 
Concerning unfair Business-to-Consumer Commercial practices in the internal market 
and amending Council Directive 84/450/eeC, Directives 97/7/eC, 98/27/eC and 2002/65/
eC of the european parliament and of the Council and regulation (eC) no 2006/2004 of 
the european parliament and of the Council (“unfair Commercial practices Directive”)’ 
(COM (2013) 139 final) (Brussels: European Commission, 2013) 12.
8 art 2(e) uCp Directive. 
9 art 2(h) uCp Directive. on ‘professional diligence’, see, e.g., h Collins, 
‘harmonisation by example: european laws against unfair Commercial practices’ (2010) 
73 Modern Law Review 98 ff.
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of either of these two, there is no need to further test whether the practice is also 
unfair according to the main general clause of unfairness.10 
misleading practices are divided into two categories: misleading information 
and misleading omissions. Misleading information consists of those utterances 
which contain incorrect information and are therefore untruthful or which in any 
way deceive or are likely to deceive the average consumer, even if the information 
is factually correct. such practices cause distortion of the transactional decision-
making process of the average consumer in relation to aspects such as the existence 
or nature of the product, fitness for purpose, usage, quantity, specification, the 
price or the manner in which the price is calculated, or the need for a service, part, 
replacement or repair.11 
Misleading omissions concern the practice of omitting or hiding material 
information – including the provision of such information in an unclear, 
unintelligible, ambiguous or untimely manner – which the average consumer 
needs, according to the context, to take an informed transactional decision and 
thus causing distortion of the transactional decision-making process of this 
average consumer.12
Aggressive practices involve actual harassment, coercion, the use of physical 
force, or the use of more subtle techniques involving undue influence such as 
exploitation of vulnerability or the use of obstacles discouraging consumers 
from asserting their rights.13 For example, artificially raising barriers to exit 
from a contract or to the exercise of contractual rights may constitute an unfair 
commercial practice.14
apart from these open-textured standards on ‘unfair’, ‘misleading’ and 
‘aggressive’ practices, the UCP Directive also imposes specific prohibitions. 
annex i to the Directive consists of a ‘black list’ of certain practices deemed unfair 
under any circumstances.15 for example, a commercial practice ‘describing a 
product as “gratis”, “free”, “without charge” or similar, if the consumer has to pay 
anything other than the unavoidable cost of responding to the commercial practice 
and collecting or paying for delivery of the item’.16 The same single list applies 
10 eCJ 19 september 2013, Case C-435/11 (CHS Tour Services GmbH v Team4 
Travel GmbH).
11 art 6(1) uCp Directive. 
12 art 7 uCp Directive. 
13 art 8 and 9 uCp Directive. 
14 european Commission, ‘Commission staff Working Document – Guidance on 
the implementation/application of Directive 2005/29/eC on unfair Commercial practices’ 
(seC (2009) 1666) (Brussels: european Commission, 2009) 11.
15 see art 5(5) in conjunction with annex i of the uCp Directive. The blacklisted 
practices are deemed unfair in the sense that no further evidence of unfairness, misleading 
or aggressive nature is required. on the relationship between the different categories, see, 
e.g., stuyck, Terryn and van Dyck, 132 ff.
16 see annex i, no 20 of the uCp Directive. Cf. eCJ 18 october 2012, Case 
C-428/11 (Purely Creative Ltd and Ors v Office of Fair Trading).
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in all Member States and may only be modified by revision of this Directive. If 
a practice is listed, there is no need to assess whether it is contrary to the rules of 
professional diligence and whether it has materially distorted or would have been 
likely to materially distort the economic behaviour of the average consumer. if 
this list is not exhaustive of all unfair commercial practices,17 it nonetheless lists 
exhaustively all the commercial practices presumed to be unfair.18
apart from prohibitions of unfair commercial practices, the uCp Directive 
covers two further subjects aimed at introducing positive obligations and 
promoting fair commercial practices in the European Union. As far as the first 
aspect is concerned, the uCp Directive includes an obligation on traders to 
positively disclose certain information at a certain stage of the marketing and 
sales process. This obligation is incurred whenever traders make an ‘invitation 
to purchase’ to consumers.19 The Directive lists a number of items on which 
traders need to positively disclose information when ‘inviting’ consumers to enter 
a commercial transaction, such as main characteristics and price.20 as concerns 
the second aspect, the uCp Directive encourages the use of Codes of Conduct to 
support the dissemination of fair commercial practices. it does so, for example, 
by designating as misleading the practice of falsely claiming to be a signatory to 
a code of conduct as well as the practice of undertaking and publicly signalling 
to be bound by, while at the same time not complying with, firm commitments 
contained in a code of conduct.21 
as mentioned, the uCp Directive follows the maximum harmonization 
principle. However, the Directive contains significant exceptions. Article 3(2) 
provides that the Directive is without prejudice to contract law and, in particular, 
to the rules on the validity, formation or effect of a contract (e.g., rules on fraud, 
mistake and misrepresentation). This is usually understood to be an exception in 
favour of national private law. article 3(9) allows more restrictive national rules 
17 art 5(5) read in conjunction with recital 17.
18 a Garde, ‘The unfair Commercial practices Directive: a successful example 
of legislative harmonisation?’, in p syrpis (ed.), The Judiciary, the Legislature and the 
Internal Market (Cambridge university press, 2012) 118.
19 according to art 2(i) uCp Directive, an ‘invitation to purchase’ means a 
commercial communication which indicates characteristics of the product and the price 
in a way appropriate to the means of the commercial communication used and thereby 
enables the consumer to make a purchase. Judging from eCJ 12 may 2011, C-122/10 
(Konsumentombudsmannen / Ving Sverige AB), traders who advertise their products and 
services are well advised not to include a price reference in their advertisements since 
this may lead to the conclusion that they have made an ‘invitation’. Cf. Commission Staff 
Working Document – Guidance on the Implementation/Application of Directive 2005/29/
EC on Unfair Commercial Practices (SEC (2009) 1666) 47 f.
20 see art 7(4) uCp Directive. 
21 see annex i(1) and art 6(2) (b) uCp Directive. see also art 10 uCp Directive 
which allows member states to encourage code owners to exercise control on unfair 
commercial practices.
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in the area of financial services. Thus, as far as financial services are concerned, 
the Directive is an instrument of minimum harmonization. furthermore, in case 
of conflict between the provisions of this Directive and other Community rules 
regulating specific aspects of unfair commercial practices, the latter shall prevail 
and apply to those specific aspects (article 3[4]).
finally, as far as enforcement is concerned, member states are to implement 
the Directive and to choose adequate and effective means of combatting unfair 
commercial practices in the interest of consumers.22 it is left to member states 
to choose the exact form enforcement will take on their territories, as long as it 
offers persons and organizations having legitimate interest (including competitors) 
recourse to an administrative or judicial procedure.23 such procedures should at 
least offer the possibility of ordering the prohibition of imminent unfair practices 
and cessation of on-going practices.24 moreover, member states shall lay down 
and enforce effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties for infringements.25 
2. Three recurring Themes
The key issues that stand out include: the problematic nature of maximum 
harmonization by means of general clauses in an area as broad as that of commercial 
practices; the unpredictable influence on national private law doctrines such 
as contract, tort and even the practice of self-regulation; and the relative open-
endedness of the Directive in relation to both other forms of market regulation and 
the frameworks of enforcement at member state level. Three topical and related 
issues deserve further analysis and have been given a prominent place throughout 
this volume. first, there is the tension between autonomy, empowerment and 
protection which can be sensed throughout the uCp Directive. secondly, there 
is the problematic nature of the maximum harmonization principle. Thirdly, the 
ways in which the Directive is enforced at member state level have given rise to 
a plethora of questions. 
2.1 Tension between Autonomy, Empowerment and Protection
The core of the uCp Directive lies in the information paradigm: by assuring a flow 
of correct and meaningful information, transactional decisions of consumers are 
undistorted and can therefore be assumed to be taken in accordance with consumer 
preferences.26 from this perspective, the uCp Directive is part and parcel of the 
22 art 11(1) uCp Directive. 
23 art 11(1) uCp Directive.
24 art 11(1) and (2) uCp Directive.
25 art 13 uCp Directive.
26 The information paradigm is also apparent from the requirement under art 7(4) 
uCp Directive to provide certain material information prior to contracting. for additional 
and overlapping ‘material information’ requirements see art 5(1) of the Consumer rights 
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classical economic framework of eu consumer policy. The uCp Directive, like 
so many rules of eu consumer law, is modelled around the average consumer. 
This elusive ‘average consumer’ is a non-existent model of human being, not a 
statistical average, which serves as a normative yardstick.27 The framework thus 
assumes that consumers are rational choice actors who are ‘reasonably well 
informed and reasonably observant and circumspect’.28 
That said, the uCp Directive does bear witness of the tension between the 
information paradigm aimed at bolstering autonomy and emphasizing individual 
responsibility on the one hand and protection of consumers generally and 
vulnerable groups in particular against repeat-players with superior knowledge 
on how consumers respond to certain commercial practices and how they can 
be encouraged, persuaded, seduced, bedazzled, pestered, overloaded and 
discouraged. The Directive aims at protecting consumers against unfair practices 
while on the other it underlines the individual’s responsibility by reference to 
the average consumer. according to the Court’s case law, the ‘reasonably well 
informed and reasonably observant and circumspect’ consumer can be expected to 
make a serious effort at collecting and understanding all available information on 
essential aspects of a contract.29 so, the ‘average consumer’ is neither credulous, 
nor easily impressed nor quickly deceived. national courts applying this standard 
may find themselves offering less protection to consumers than they were used to 
under pre-existing national protective frameworks.30
On the other hand, the ‘model consumer’ who is confident and proactive in 
gathering and processing information before making transactional decisions is 
supplemented by the consumer who is particularly vulnerable ‘to the practice 
or the underlying product because of their mental or physical infirmity, age or 
credulity’.31 obviously, the question is what makes these groups vulnerable 
in connection with commercial practices. and are they the only ones prone to 
succumb to certain unfair practices? Given the human model of ‘homo heuristicus’ 
developed by behavioural economics, one could even argue that all consumers 
Directive 2011/83/eu. obviously, the uCp Directive is also concerned with aggressive 
commercial practices. 
27 Commission Staff Working Document – Guidance on the Implementation/
Application of Directive 2005/29/EC on Unfair Commercial Practices (SEC (2009) 1666) 
28.
28 eCJ 16 July 1998, C-210/96 (Gut Springenheide). 
29 eCJ 16 July 1998, C-210/96 (Gut Springenheide); eCJ 19 september 2006, 
C-356/04 (Lidl and Colruyt); cf. eCJ 6 July 1995, C-470/93, Jur. 1995 p. i-01923 (Mars). 
30 on the damping effect of the uCp Directive on more protective legal systems, 
see eg., stuyck, Terryn and van Dyck, 134 ff.
31 art 5(3). Cf. s Weatherill, ‘Who is the “average Consumer”?’, in s Weatherill 
and u Bernitz (eds), The Regulation of Unfair Commercial Practices under EC Directive 
2005/29. New Rules and New Techniques (oxford: hart publishing, 2006) 115 ff.; 
r incardona and C poncibò, ‘The average Consumer, the unfair Commercial practices 
Directive, and the Cognitive revolution’ (2007) 30 Journal of Consumer Policy 21, 21 ff.
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are vulnerable individuals who merit some form of protection against traders who 
have superior knowledge on consumer behaviour and on how to make clever use 
of human deficiencies.32
it is sometimes said that consumers should take more responsibility for their 
decisions. for example, in discharging its duties, the financial Conduct authority 
(fCa), is under a duty to apply a number of principles including the principle 
‘that consumers should take responsibility for their decisions’ (s. 3B fsma 
2000). This sounds stern; but what does that actually mean in markets where 
products are difficult to comprehend to begin with, are deliberately made even 
more complex, and where consumers are short-sighted, inert and/or literally or 
figuratively illiterate? The consequence of all this may be that national courts may 
feel restrained in offering redress to consumers according to the rather stern ‘homo 
economicus’ model underlying the uCp Directive. They may instead resort to 
national private law to provide fitting remedies when the UCP Directive turns out 
to be too ‘trader friendly’. a prime example of this is offered by a Dutch case. 
a retail bank who had designed and marketed inherently dangerous investment 
products to the general public was held liable on the basis of the (precursor to the) 
uCp Directive for producing a misleading prospectus. The supreme Court held, in 
a nutshell, that in this case the eu Directive did not offer any solace. in essence, it 
ruled that the ‘homo economicus’ consumer should have been more cautious when 
reading the material:33 ‘[...] it may be expected from a reasonably observant and 
circumspect consumer that he makes reasonable efforts in advance to comprehend 
the implications of the contract and its ensuing obligations and risks, and that he 
prudently considers endorsements, praise and examples.’ so, the Dutch supreme 
Court did not consider this to be a case of misleading omission under eu rules. 
Yet, that was not the end of the case. The Court then switched to protection of 
the ‘homo heuristicus’ on the basis of national tort law. it ruled that the bank had 
neglected a duty to explicitly warn for inherent risks of the investment and to 
check suitability and affordability.34 
so, the outcome apparently is that national private law may offer better 
protection for consumers than the uCp framework. since the uCp Directive is 
32 The literature is abundant. We merely refer by means of example to Cr sunstein 
(ed.), Behavioral Law and Economics (Cambridge series on Judgment and Decision 
making, Cambridge: Cambridge university press, 2000); rh Thaler and Cr sunstein, 
Nudge – Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness (new haven: Yale 
university press, 2008); rB Korobkin and Ts ulen, ‘law and Behavioral science: 
removing the rationality assumption from law and economics’ (2000) 88 Cal. L. Rev. 
1051 ff. for a similar argument, see stuyck, Terryn and van Dyck, 121 f.
33 Dutch supreme Court 5 June 2009, eCli:nl:hr:2009:Bh2815. Cf. Wh van 
Boom, ‘The netherlands’ in Civic Consulting (ed.), Study on the Application of Directive 
2005/29/EC on Unfair Commercial Practices in the EU / Part 2 – Country Reports (Civic 
Consulting, Berlin, 2011) 7.1 ff. 
34 Dutch supreme Court 5 June 2009, eCli:nl:hr:2009:Bh2815.
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without prejudice to contract law35 – or perhaps even broader: private law? – at the 
member state level there may be more than one track for disappointed consumers 
to follow.
2.2 Maximum Harmonization Principle
subject to limited exceptions the uCp Directive is subject to the maximum 
harmonization principle.36 The underlying rationale is that this guarantees a fair 
balance between traders’ duties and consumers’ rights, and creates legal certainty 
and a pan-European level playing field. However, the generic horizontal character of 
the Directive, combined with a broad-brushed scope, causes issues of demarcation. 
it is not entirely clear where the Directive begins and ends. arguably, this is a 
problematic feature when combined with the maximum harmonization principle.
There are notable exceptions to the maximum harmonization principle which 
merit a brief overview. Moreover, the scope of the Directive is defined in such a 
way that in some respects or for some economic activities, the Directive does not 
stand in the way of more protective legislation at member state level:
• The UCP Directive is an instrument of minimum harmonization in 
the domains of financial services and immovable property. By way of 
exception the uCp Directive is of a minimum harmonization character in 
these areas.37 it was thought that the complexity and inherent serious risks 
surrounding these products and markets may require more detailed and 
tailored rulemaking at member state level.38 in its recent evaluation of the 
uCp Directive, the european Commission addresses the question whether 
article 3(9) uCp Directive merits repealing.39 The Commission concludes 
that the exceptions to the maximum harmonization principle will be left 
unchanged.40 Therefore, member states will continue to be allowed to 
apply more stringent rules on commercial practices in the financial services 
domain. 
35 art 3(2) uCp Directive provides that it is ‘without prejudice to contract law and, 
in particular, to the rules on the validity, formation or effect of a contract’. 
36 Cf. recital 14, 15, 5 uCp Directive. 
37 art 3(9) uCp Directive.
38 recital (9). 
39 art 18 uCp Directive charges the eC with submitting a review of the experiences 
with the uCp Directive by 12 June 2011. The review was submitted in march 2013. 
40 european Commission, ‘first report on the application of Directive 2005/29/
eC of the european parliament and of the Council of 11 may 2005 Concerning unfair 
Business-to-Consumer Commercial practices in the internal market and amending Council 
Directive 84/450/eeC, Directives 97/7/eC, 98/27/eC and 2002/65/eC of the european 
parliament and of the Council and regulation (eC) no 2006/2004 of the european 
parliament and of the Council (“unfair Commercial practices Directive”)’ (Com (2013) 
139 final), Brussels 2013.
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• The UCP Directive does not harmonize contract law. The Directive 
explicitly states that it ‘is without prejudice to contract law and, in particular, 
to the rules on the validity, formation or effect of a contract’.41 one may 
ask whether ‘contract law’ should not be read as ‘private law’ since some 
jurisdictions categorize pre-contractual duties or defectiveness of consent 
as part of tort law rather than contract law.42 
• Health and safety aspects. The Directive itself more or less excludes 
rules relating to ‘the health and safety aspects of products’ from its scope 
by stating that the Directive is ‘without prejudice’ to such rules.43 This 
seems to be a rather enigmatic exception since the Directive concerns the 
protection of informed and unintimidated transactional decision-making. if 
the exclusion of health and safety aspects of products is to be justified by 
the fact that such rules relate to the quality of products or by some motive to 
protect consumers against specific risks or against themselves, then surely 
more rules can be deemed excluded. for instance, should commercial 
practices concerning gambling not be explicitly excluded as well?44
• Rules pertaining to regulated professions are outside the scope of the 
Directive. so, national authorization regimes and establishment restrictions 
remain unaffected by the Directive.45 also, national requirements related to 
‘taste and decency’ are considered to be outside the scope of the Directive.46 
• Scope of consumer protection. The Directive aims at protecting consumers. 
This raises the question whether more restrictive national rules which may 
have a bearing on business-to-consumer relationships but in fact have a 
different goal (for instance, the protection of competitors) are affected by 
the Directive. one can think of restrictions of retail shops opening hours for 
the protection of employees and prohibition of sunday trading for religious 
reasons. in Pelckmans Turnhout, the eCJ ruled that national provisions 
genuinely pursuing other objectives than consumer protection are outside 
the scope of the Directive.47 
41 art 3(2) uCp Directive. 
42 Cf. the German notion of liability for ‘culpa in contrahendo’ (§§ 311 [2] 
Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch) or the french liability for ‘fautes’ in precontractual dealings 
(art 1382 Code Civil). 
43 art 3(3) uCp Directive. 
44 note that recital (9) of the preamble to the uCp Directive suggests that 
regulation concerning gambling services remain unaffected by the Directive. This probably 
only follows if one underwrites to a broad interpretation of art 3(8) uCp Directive so as 
to include any regulatory regime setting quality standards or prohibiting certain practices. 
admittedly, if one accepts such a broad construction of ‘any conditions of establishment or 
of authorisation regimes imposed on professionals’ then the uCp Directive as a whole is 
effectively neutralized by regulatory regimes at member state level.
45 art 3(8) uCp Directive. 
46 see recital 7 preamble uCp Directive. 
47 eCJ 4 october 2012, C-559/11, Pelckmans Turnhout NV v Walter Van Gastel 
Balen et al. note that the eCJ queries whether the objectives are ‘related’ to consumer 
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• Collisions with other EU rules. In case of conflicting rules, the Directive 
gives way to those specific rules.48 for instance, where a dedicated eu 
regulation sets particular rules on information disclosure in the online 
sales of airline tickets which are more specific and stricter than the UCP 
Directive rules on pre-contractual information duties, these special rules 
have priority. This is also the case where these specific EU rules are of a 
minimum harmonization character.
leaving these exceptions aside, the scope of the maximum harmonization 
nature of the Directive is contested. The dominant position seems to be that the 
Directive does not allow categorical prohibitions of certain practices if and to 
the extent that such national prohibitions aim at consumer protection. This would 
interfere with the Directive’s all-encompassing scope of maximum harmonization, 
or so the eCJ holds. in fact, the eCJ has ruled that a national regime generally 
prohibiting combined offers is incompatible with the uCp Directive. likewise, 
a general prohibition of practices making the participation in a prize competition 
or lottery conditional on the purchase of goods is incompatible with the uCp 
Directive.49 The same applies to general prohibitions of sales with bonuses,50 
general prohibitions of advertising upcoming sales in a particular period51 or 
without authorization.52 note that while general prohibitions are not allowed, there 
can be good reasons to intervene in particular cases where a promotional offer or 
other marketing technique contravenes the standards for misleading, aggressive or 
otherwise unfair commercial practices. This would, however, require individual 
assessment in light of the given circumstances, which is significantly different 
from an unconditional and general ban on certain practices. 
The upshot of all this is that member states cannot administer their own 
national ‘black lists’. The annex is exhaustive. The basic idea of an exhaustive 
black list was justified with the argument that ‘it was essential to overcome the 
protection, which may a broader and more factual test than the mere enquiry into the aims of 
the national provisions. see also recital (6) of preamble to the uCp Directive, which states 
that the Directive “[…] neither covers nor affects the national laws on unfair commercial 
practices which harm only competitors’ economic interests or which relate to a transaction 
between traders” (emphasis added, eds).
48 eCJ 23 april 2009, C-261/07 and C-299/07 (VTB–VAB NV v Total Belgium NV 
and Galatea BVBA v Sanoma Magazines Belgium NV). in a similar vein eCJ 11 march 
2010, C-522/08 (Telekomunikacja Polska).
49 eCJ 14 January 2010, C-304/08 (Zentrale zur Bekämpfung unlauteren 
Wettbewerbs eV v Plus Warenhandelsgesellschaft mbH).
50 eCJ 9 november 2010, Case C-540/08 (Mediaprint Zeitungs– und 
Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co KG v ‘Österreich’–Zeitungsverlag GmbH). 
51 eCJ 15 December 2011, C-288/10 (Wamo BVBA v JBC NV and Modemakers 
Fashion NV) and eCJ 11 December 2011, C-126/11 (Inno NV v Unizo and others).
52 eCJ 17 January 2013, C-206/11 (Köck v Schutzverband gegen unlauteren 
Wettbewerb).
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specific legal barriers caused by the fragmented regulation of unfair commercial 
practices, which gave rise to cost, complexity and uncertainty for both businesses 
and consumers.’53 However, it is debatable whether having a fixed list at the EU 
level without any room for considering ‘local practices’ that may merit similar 
outright banning is the most efficient way of dealing with unfair commercial 
practices in europe. responding to national incidents by amending rules and 
thus prohibiting certain unfair practices at a national level to curb excesses can 
be part of a rational, devolved policy-making process. By pre-empting legislative 
intervention at the member state level, national ‘black lists’ have been rendered 
impossible and so have the national legislative policies targeting ‘local’ unfair 
practices. What remains, is the aspiration of maximum harmonization by means 
of a combination of a european black list and general clauses on misleading, 
aggressive and unfair commercial practices broadly defined. As will be shown 
throughout this volume, it remains to be seen whether this aspiration, supported 
by the eu ‘mantra’ of increasing legal certainty for both consumers and businesses 
through maximum harmonization,54 is realistically attainable in this area.55 
2.3 Enforcement
member states are supposed to have implemented the uCp Directive by 12 June 
2007.56 The range of techniques applied by member states in implementing 
the uCp Directive differs vastly.57 in the united Kingdom, the Directive was 
implemented through the Consumer protection from unfair Trading regulations 
2008 (si 2008/1277).58 The legal embedding of the Directive in the united 
53 (COM (2013) 139 final) 4.
54 see, e.g., recital (12). 
55 Cf. stuyck, Terryn and van Dyck, 148; B Keirsbilck, ‘Towards a single 
regulatory framework on unfair Commercial practices?’ (2009) EBLR 507, 509.
56 art 19 uCp Directive. The measures shall be applied by 12 December 2007. 
Until 12 June 2013, Member States are allowed under specific conditions to continue to 
apply ‘national provisions within the field approximated by this Directive which are more 
restrictive or prescriptive than this Directive and which implement directives containing 
minimum harmonisation clauses’ (art 3(5) uCp Directive).
57 Generally on the differences in enforcement style and culture in consumer law, 
see the contributions to Wh van Boom and mBm loos (eds), Collective Enforcement 
of Consumer Law – Securing Compliance in Europe through Private Group Action and 
Public Authority Intervention (european studies in private law, Groningen: europa law 
publishing, 2007) .
58 in the united Kingdom, administrative enforcement powers are assigned to 
the Competition and markets authority (Cma; formerly: ofT) and the local Trading 
standards authorities. see Consumer protection from unfair Trading regulations 2008 as 
amended by the Public Bodies (The Office of Fair Trading Transfer of Consumer Advice 
Scheme Function and Modification of Enforcement Functions) Order 2013. Enforcement 
in the financial services domain is the responsibility of the FCA. See S. 213 Enterprise Act 
2002 as amended by s. 95 financial services act 2012.
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Kingdom is such that originally individual consumers were not entitled to redress 
on the basis of the regulations, nor are their contracts directly affected. instead, 
enforcement is largely achieved by administrative enforcement orders and criminal 
law sanctions.59 however, the amendment of the Consumer protection from unfair 
Trading regulations 2008, which is currently underway, will introduce under 
specified conditions individual rights of redress for consumers (i.e., the right to 
unwind, the right to a discount and a right to damages).60
in Germany, where there is a rich legislative tradition of prohibiting unfair 
commercial practices as part of competition law, the uCp Directive was 
implemented by means of amendment of the pre-existing framework of the act 
against unfair Competition (Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb; uWG). The 
German enforcement model traditionally relies on private actions for injunction 
initiated by representative organizations although recently a public authority 
was assigned the task to address cross-border unfair commercial practices.61 
essentially, the German enforcement model relies on private law rather than 
criminal law remedies.62
By contrast, in the netherlands implementation measures include implementing 
a tort of unfair commercial practices in the Civil Code supplemented by 
administrative law fining powers and enforcement orders. Here, the emphasis is 
on a two-track system of individual and representative civil litigation on the one 
hand and administrative law enforcement on the other. in Dutch practice, however, 
the role of sophisticated self-regulation to distinguish reputable traders from rogue 
traders plays an important ‘soft-law enforcement role’ as well.63 
These few examples show some of the differences in enforcement culture 
at member state level. in particular, the member states are left to decide 
whether the concept of unfair commercial practices is introduced in private law 
and consequentially whether private law remedies are available to individual 
consumers.64 
59 McGuffick v Royal Bank of Scotland plc (2009) eWhC 2386 (Comm). Cf. 
enterprise act 2002, part 8 (enforcement of certain consumer legislation). see also l fox 
o’mahony, Home Equity and Ageing Owners – Between Risk and Regulation (oxford: hart 
publishing, 2012) 259; Collins, 111 ff. 
60 Consumer protection from unfair Trading (amendment) regulations 2013 
(draft regulations). 
61 see the Consumer protection and food safety authority act 2002 (Gesetz 
über die errichtung eines Bundesamtes für verbraucherschutz und lebensmittelsicherheit 
[BVL-Gesetz-BVLG]).
62 Yet, the uWG does penalize certain infringements; see §16–19 uWG.
63 see further van Boom para 7.1 ff.
64 see G De Cristofaro, ‘Die zivilrechtlichen folgen des verstoszes gegen das 
verbot unlauterer Geschäftspraktiken: eine vergleichende analyse der lösungen der eu-
mitgliedstaaten’ (2010) Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht Internationaler Teil 
(Grur int) 1017, for an overview of choices made by member states. 
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The lack of uniformity in the choice of enforcement framework is obviously the 
result of the leeway left by the Directive to member states. as long as the national 
framework sanctions infringements effectively, proportionately and dissuasively,65 
and offers individuals, businesses and interested organizations recourse to an 
administrative or judicial procedure concerning prohibition and stopping orders,66 
the obligations under the UCP Directive are satisfied. Understandably, the result of 
this application of the principle of national procedural autonomy is the continued 
existence of differences in enforcement framework, style and culture across the 
member states. hence, it may not come as a surprise that in its recent report on 
the application of the uCp Directive, the european Commission mainly considers 
pathways towards strengthening enforcement activities at member state level and 
for cross-border practices.67 
3. The Contributions gathered in This Collection
Having briefly introduced the three themes that are woven into the fabric of the 
contributions to this book, we can now summarize the various chapters and see 
how they interrelate. The book is roughly divided into four parts. 
3.1 Implementation, Approximation and Harmonization
part i deals with issues of implementation, approximation and harmonization. as 
noted earlier, the maximum harmonization nature of the uCp Directive and the 
exceptions to its scope raise particular issues of convergence and divergence of 
national legal systems. for instance, in what areas does the uCp Directive leave 
room for manoeuvring? in what ways does the uCp Directive cause frictions with 
domestic law? Does it conflict with other areas of EU and domestic consumer law? 
in their contribution ‘uK implementation of the unfair Commercial practices 
Directive’, marios Koutsias and Chris Willett take some of these issues as a 
starting point to discuss the uK experience with the uCp Directive. Their analysis 
shows that while the traditional uK approach was one of criminal enforcement, 
the developments surrounding the implementation of the uCp Directive have 
prompted a blending of this traditional approach with a seemingly more european 
enforcement approach which stresses preventive techniques. in other respects, the 
authors argue, the process of ‘europeanization’ through the uCp Directive has 
started to influence fairness concepts in the domestic regulatory landscape and 
perhaps even in private law. as concerns the substantive reach of the Directive, 
Koutsias and Willett also predict that the regulation of commercial practices in the 
financial services industry will largely remain outside the maximum harmonization 
65 art 13 uCp Directive.
66 art 11(1) and (2) uCp Directive.
67 COM (2013) 139 final.
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principle and hence within the national legislative realm. The ‘home grown’ 
financial services regime is likely to remain dominant, they convincingly argue. 
Bert Keirsbilck devotes his contribution ‘pre-emption of national prohibitions 
of Sale Below Cost: Some Reflections on EU Law Between Past and Future’ to 
the troublesome pre-emptive effect of the maximum harmonization principle 
underlying the Directive. as mentioned earlier, the fact that the Directive moves 
well into border territories of generic market regulation raises numerous issues 
of demarcation. for instance, national prohibitions of sales below cost obviously 
affect consumers but are usually also aimed – or even primarily or exclusively 
aimed – at some sort of protected competition. To what extent do such market 
design rules clash with the uCp Directive? Keirsbilck focuses on the viability 
of national prohibitions of sales below cost in light of european law. he argues 
that the maximum harmonization principle underlying the Directive forbids 
national prohibitions of business-to-consumer sales below cost in so far as such 
prohibitions pursue consumer protection objectives. 
in her contribution ‘The Blacklist of unfair Commercial practices: The Black 
sheep, red herring or White elephant of the unfair Commercial practices 
Directive?’, Monika Namysłowska focuses specifically on the Black List in 
annex i to the uCp Directive, which bans 31 particular commercial practices. 
although the introduction of a Black list was aimed at increasing legal certainty 
and consumer confidence, one may wonder whether this aim has been achieved. 
Some of the prohibitions encapsulated in the List are difficult to apply; others 
are in fact rather vague and open-textured creating uncertainty instead. moreover, 
given the maximum harmonization principle the Black lists pre-empts any 
legislative attempts at the member state level to introduce, amend or extend 
the listed practices. Namysłowska argues that the various national methods of 
implementation of Annex I and the dissimilar notions and legal definitions at the 
member state level add to the complexity of the uCp Directive regime, render 
uniform interpretation difficult and may even hinder effective enforcement. 
3.2 Vulnerability
part ii of this volume deals with vulnerability issues. The uCp Directive is slightly 
ambiguous as concerns vulnerability due to age, mental or physical condition. on 
the one hand, the Directive assumes consumers to be ‘reasonably well informed 
and reasonably observant and circumspect’.68 Therefore, the ‘model consumer’ is 
considered to be confident and proactive in gathering and processing information 
before making transactional decisions. on the other hand, however, the Directive 
seems to offer specific protection to old, young, disabled and challenged consumers. 
obviously, the question is what makes these groups vulnerable in connection with 
commercial practices. and are they the only ones prone to succumb to certain 
unfair practices? Given the human model of ‘homo heuristicus’ developed by 
68 Cf. art 5(2) uCp Directive.
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behavioural economics, one could even argue that all consumers are vulnerable 
individuals. 
against this background marine friant-perrot discusses ‘The vulnerable 
Consumer in the uCpD and other provisions of eu law’. she argues that the 
concept of vulnerability is multi-facetted and in fact covers different realities. 
vulnerability may even consist of the lack of opportunities to access certain – 
essential or non-essential – services and goods. as friant-perrot shows, consumer 
vulnerability is widespread and as such needs to be taken into account when 
judging both the unfairness of commercial practices and the hazardous nature or 
suitability of certain goods and services.
3.3 The UCP Directive and Other Regimes
in part iii, the interaction between the uCp Directive regime with other forms of 
regulation of traders’ behaviour is discussed. how does the uCp Directive relate 
to other eu rules of consumer protection? Does it complement or interfere with 
other regimes – be they legislative, regulatory or self-regulatory? 
in her contribution, ‘Can the uCp Directive really Be a vector of legal 
Certainty?’, amandine Garde focuses on the extent to which the objective of legal 
certainty, which is strongly enshrined in the uCp Directive, can realistically be 
attained. she argues that if the uCp Directive may inject a degree of certainty into 
the eu regulatory framework, largely through its annex of black-listed practices, 
the use of extremely broad, loosely defined concepts in the Directive’s general 
clauses is unlikely to promote the level-playing field promised by the Commission 
to traders, consumers and member states alike. The second part of the contribution 
focuses more specifically on the uneasy relationship existing between the UCP 
Directive and other provisions of eu law. in particular, it evaluates how the 
horizontal provisions of the UCP Directive relate to more specific provisions 
intended to refine the notions of misleading and unfair practices in specific sectors 
of the EU economy or in relation to specific business-to-consumer commercial 
practices. Overall, this contribution concludes that fine lines will have to be drawn 
to determine which practices fall within and which practices fall outside the scope 
of the UCP Directive and that difficult questions remain regarding the extent to 
which Member States still benefit, notwithstanding the maximum harmonization 
clause contained in the Directive, from a margin of autonomy to protect consumers 
from unfair commercial practices on their territories.
The contribution ‘The interaction between the unfair Commercial practices 
Directive and self-regulation: The Case of Codes of Conduct’ by Charlotte 
pavillon offers an in-depth analysis of the relationship between the uCp Directive 
and self-regulatory quality enhancement through voluntary codes of conduct. 
pavillon shows that although the Directive seems to encourage the use of such 
codes, in practice such codes seldom extend or build on the Directive’s general 
fairness clause and neither do they advance the Directive’s pan-european 
harmonization aspirations. pavillon therefore argues that ideally the Directive is 
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to be amended so as to strengthen the contribution of codes of conduct to the 
standards laid down in the Directive while preserving the right balance between 
consumers’ and traders’ interests. 
in his contribution ‘a Common approach to the enforcement of unfair 
Commercial practices and unfair Contract Terms’, hans micklitz proposes that a 
more coordinated approach is taken in relation to unfair commercial practices and 
unfair contract terms. eu member states tend to consider these two phenomena 
separate and distinct. Traditionally, the framework for tackling unfair commercial 
practices is primarily geared towards the regulation of markets and competition 
whereas unfair terms legislation is mostly concerned with substantive standards 
of protection in contract law. however, micklitz shows that the worlds of unfair 
commercial practices and unfair contract terms are not as far apart as one might 
think and that in line with recent trends in eCJ case law a convergent approach 
to both fields of law is appropriate. If one looks at the UCP Directive, however, 
one will notice its wide scope. Thus, the assessment of the fairness of contract 
terms may quickly turn out to overlap with the uCp regime. using unfair terms 
may mystify the consumer’s legal position and may thus become misleading as a 
practice rather than as a term. 
3.4 Enforcement Issues
finally, in part iv various issues of enforcement come to the fore. in principle, 
The uCp Directive leaves it to member states to decide on the enforcement 
architecture. The result is a plethora of instruments across the european union, 
each with their advantages and drawbacks. What lessons can be learned from the 
various choices made by member states? recently, the european Commission 
communicated its first report on the application of the Directive. The gist of the 
report is that the uCp Directive itself is adequate as it stands but that enforcement 
efforts need to be intensified.69 This is all the more reason to delve deeper into the 
enforcement issues. 
franziska Weber writes on ‘law and economics of enforcing misleading 
advertising laws: incentives of Bona and mala fide Traders assessed’. as the 
title suggests, this is a law and economics analysis of misleading advertising. The 
harm caused to society by such unfair commercial practices is exacerbated by the 
fact that enforcement efforts are non-existent, slow or ineffective. Weber argues 
that the law should try to distinguish between bona fide traders and mala fide 
traders. While the latter inadvertently breach the law, rogue traders’ interests lie in 
the short-term profit generated by their illegal activities. Since the UCP Directive 
leaves national legislatures with considerable discretion regarding the choice of 
enforcement tools and the national configuration of the various institutions and 
enforcers differs, the question is how Member States may design an efficient 
enforcement framework. Weber tries to answer why no one-size-fits-all solution is 
69 (COM (2013) 139 final).
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available for all european member states and how national legislatures may take 
certain design requirements into account when devising their national frameworks.
In the final contribution to this section, Dörte Poelzig poses the question ‘Private 
or public enforcement of the uCp Directive? sanctions and remedies to prevent 
unfair Commercial practices’. The various national enforcement strategies are 
reviewed. poelzig surveys the main divide between member states relying on 
public enforcement – using criminal law or administrative law – and those taking 
private law enforcement as a starting point. Given the need to ensure the full 
effectiveness of the uCp Directive, poelzig argues that it is essential to establish 
a level playing field of effective enforcement and to identify the comparative 
strengths and weaknesses of the various available instruments. 
4. Outlook
This volume addresses some of the practical concerns which have arisen since 
the UCP Directive entered into force. It assesses whether the difficulties which 
were anticipated in earlier academic writings have in fact materialized and what 
unexpected issues have arisen since. in doing so, it takes stock of the various 
policy developments, the growing body of case law developed both by the CJeu 
and by national courts, the decisions of relevant national enforcement authorities, 
as well as the legislative debates which have surrounded the implementation of the 
uCp Directive in member states. if anything, the contributions to this book bear 
witness of the complexity of the field of commercial practices and the multitude of 
issues that deserve further research. 
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